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I. Introduction
Japan experienced 0-1% annual growth of GDP in real terms in 1990s and 2000s while 
both its trade surplus and current surplus in the balance of payments was about 2 to 5% of 
GDP in the same period (Graph 1).
Graph 1  Japan’s trade balance, income balance, current balances and capital 
balance (Japan’s Ministry of Finance)
 
Japan’s stagnant economic growth, which was lasting for 20 years, was mainly caused 
by shrinking domestic investment by Japanese multinational corporations (MNCs), 
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which have experienced domestic “bubble fever” in the late 1980s, “bubble burst” at the 
beginning of 1990s, stagnant domestic demand in the 1990s and the 2000s, and global 
financial crisis since 2008.
It is noteworthy that Japanese MNCs was very active in achieving their FDI in foreign 
countries (Graph 2).  It is quite opposite to their stagnant domestic investment, because 
of their expectation for more opportunity in foreign market than domestic market.  As 
a result, overseas production rato of Japanese firms, which are engaged in overseas 
production, to their total production, has climbed up to 33.2 % in FY (Fiscal Year) 2007 
from 24.2 % in FY 2000.  Overseas sales by Japanese firms’ affiliates in foreign countries 
amounted to about three times of the total export of goods and services by Japanese firms 
in FY 2007.  It is noteworthy that surplus in income balance, which is a result of Japan’s 
foreign investment, has exceeded trade surplus since CY 2006 (Graph 1).
Graph 2  Japan’s outward FDI flow and inward FDI flow  (UNCTAD, World Investment 
Report 2010)
All of them mean that overseas business by Japanese MNCs and their af filiates 
through foreign direct investment (FDI) is now the more important transaction tool of 
international business than international trade.
However, Japan’s FDI has dual effects on its international competitiveness.  Positive 
effect of Japan’s FDI strengthen the international competitiveness of Japanese firms and 
negative one may weaken, to some extent, Japanese firms’ competitiveness.  
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In this article, first, I clarify the origin of the international competitiveness of Japanese 
firms in Chapter II. Second, I argue various effects of global trend of “Commoditization” 
in both supply and demand sides on Japanese firms’ competitiveness in Chapter III.  And, 
third, I discuss the effects of Japan’s FDI itself on Japanese firms’ competitiveness in 
Chapter IV.  Finally, I indicate the task to be achieved now by Japanese firms through 
their organizational reforms in both domestic and overseas business and through their 
creating a new type of innovation in Chapter V.  Clearly, the reconstruction of Japanese 
firms’ international competitiveness is an important, and necessary condition for the 
reconstruction of Japanese economy.
II. The origin of the international competitiveness of Japanese firms
(2.1) Definition
In this article, the core of the international competitiveness of Japanese firms is defined 
as Japanese firms’ management, R&D (Research and Development) and production 
system for newly developing and for supplying the most qualified “Specialty products” 
with the lowest transaction cost in the “The First Best market (defined below)”.  
The definition of “Specialty products”, which causes large transaction costs, is based 
on “asset specificity” of O. Williamson (1985) i. Asymmetry of information of “Specialty 
products (defined below)” between buyers and sellers, opportunism of both parties 
and huge sank costs on them in both parties causes a large scale of transaction cost 
in both sides of buyers and sellers in both cases of market transactions and intra-firm 
transactions.  In this paper we call assets, which have “asset specificity” of Williamson 
(1985) ii, as “Specialty” products”. The “Specialty products” include both goods and 
services and both final products and intermediate goods.
Diagram 1 is presented by O. Williamson (1985), which shows that the Governance 
Cost in the market transaction is small and the Governance Cost in the intra-firm 
transaction is rather large if asset specificity is low but the former grows in accelerated 
pace and the latter grows in more moderate pace when “asset specificity (S)” becomes 
higher.  At point S0, the former and the latter are equalized.  The former becomes larger 
than the latter and the difference of the latter minus the former becomes larger when 
“asset specificity (S)” becomes higher than S0.  In this paper, Governance Cost in the 
market transaction (C2) is defined as “Market Transaction Cost (C2)” and Governance 
Cost in the intra-firm transaction (C1) is defined as “Intra-firm Transaction Cost (C1)”, 
which are described in Diagram 1.
On the other hand, Production Cost in the market transaction is small and Production 
Cost in the intra-firm transaction is rather large if asset specificity is low but the former 
and the latter are equalized if “asset specificity (S)” becomes higher.  In this paper, 
Production Cost in the market transaction (G2) is defined as “Market Production Cost 
(G2)” and Production Cost in the intra-firm transaction (G1) is defined as “Intra-firm 
Production Cost (G1)”, which are described in Diagram 1.
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A firm, which seeks for cost minimization (in other words, profit maximization) in the 
procurement of “Specialty products”, has to decide whether it purchases the “Specialty 
products” in the market or the firm internally produces them in it. Diagram 1 indicates 
that the “Specialty product”, which has lower “asset specificity (S)” than S*, shall be 
purchased in the market and the “Specialty product”, which has higher “asset specificity 
(S)” than S*, shall be produced internally by the firm itself, if the firm seeks for the cost 
minimization (in other words, profit maximization), according to O. Williamson (1985).
Diagram 1  Production Cost and Transaction Cost  (based on O. Williamson, 
Comparative Production and Governance Cost, 1985) 
However, I clarify in this paper that the Total Costs, which include Transaction Cost 
plus Production Cost, can be minimized by Japanese firms with their mechanism of 
“the Transaction Cost Minimization” in Diagram 2, which is described in sections (2.2) 
and (2.3), in procuring “Specialty products”, when those products have higher “asset 
specificity (S)” than S**.  S** has the enough high degree of “asset specificity (S)”, in 
which “Intra-firm Production Cost (G1)” shall be equalized to “Market Production Cost 
(G2)” in Diagram 1.  And, this “highly specified” “Specialty products” assumed to be 
compounded products, which are consisted of other “highly specified” “Specialty products 
(parts or intermediate goods)”, which have also higher “asset specificity (S)” than S**.    
My argument is based on TEJIMA (2006) “Changing Competitiveness of Japanese 
Firms and Role of Japan’s FDI” The Indian Economic Journal Vol. 54 No. 1, April-June, 
2006, pp83-111 and other articles in English from 1998 to 2003 in the reference list at the 
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end of this article.  The framework of “the Transaction Cost Minimization” is newly and 
more precisely developed in this article.
The international competitiveness of Japanese firms in manufacturing sectors, which 
can supply well qualified “Specialty products” with the lowest transaction cost in “The 
First Best market”, is originated from Japanese firms’ achievement of “Minimization of 
Transaction Cost” in newly development of new products and production system on them.
“The First Best market” is defined as large-scaled and sophisticated markets, buyers 
in which prefer of their purchasing the high value added “Specialty products” even at 
high price, to purchasing cost-competitive products with intermediate quality.  “The First 
Best market” is mainly prevailing among developed countries and also is growing rapidly 
among developing countries, especially in emerging economies.
“Minimization of Transaction Cost” on “Specialty products” is truly impor tant 
because newly development of the “Specialty products” and procurement of them has 
an inevitable  nature to necessarily born huge transaction cost in any case whether 
they are produced or developed internally within the firm itself or purchased in the 
market.  This “minimization of Transaction Cost” is achieved within the Transaction Cost 
Minimizing (TCM) organization of Japanese firms with the human resources, which have 
“Japanese preference”.  But it is difficult to construct “the Transaction Cost Minimization” 
organization in foreign countries because Japanese firms have to face with “Non- Japanese 
preference” in foreign countries.    
The definition of “Japanese preference” is a specified preference by most of Japanese of 
their permanently preserving the long-lasting transactions with their specified business 
partners over the long term period to their temporarily maximizing opportunistic profits 
in each business trasaction  with unfamilar counterpart.
This preference is prevailing in Japan in various business transactions between 
suppliers and assemblers and in employment contracts between employers and employees.
Human resources, who have Japanese preference, have the following five natures.
(1) Preferring of their keeping harmonization with colleagues within the company to their 
appealing their own unique idea or thought of each individual to their colleagues, to the 
company or to the society
(2) Preferring of their handling projects, which have nature of the low risk and low profit, 
to projects, which are at the high risk and high profit
(3) Preferring for being promoted his or her position within the same company over the 
long-term period to their moving quickly to other companies for seeking better position
(4) Preferring of their constructing closed networks among familiar people and 
companies to their seeking open networks with unfamiliar people and companies 
(5) Preferring of their achieving very detailed and exact works in the given framework of 
business to their presenting a new model of products and/or business with the  prominent 
leadership for realizing the new business
“Transaction Cost Minimization (TCM) organization” is consisted of Japanese human 
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resources, which have “Japanese preference”.  TCM organization is designed for 
effectively utilize Japanese human resources, who have “Japanese preference”.  The 
devices of the organization are the following: de-facto life time employment, job rotation 
system, delayed promotion system based on personnel evaluation of their employees 
over the several years, retiring money etc.  Those devices give strong motivation their 
employees to contribute to the same company over the long term period.
Non-Japanese Preference”, which is prevailing in Western and Asian companies, is 
defined that firms and human resources are preferring of their temporarily maximizing 
opportunistic profits in each business transaction with unfamiliar counterpart in the short-
term period to their permanently preserving long-lasting transaction over the long term 
period with their business partners.
Human resources, who have Non-Japanese preference, have the following five natures.
(1) Preferring of their appealing their own unique idea or thought of each individual to the 
company or to the society rather than their keeping harmonization with colleagues within 
the company
(2) Preferring of their handling projects, which are with the high risk and high profit to 
their handling projects, which are with the low risk and low profit
(3) Preferring of their moving quickly to other companies for seeking better position to 
being promoted his or her position within the same company over the long-term period
(4) Preferring of their seeking open networks with unfamiliar people and companies to 
their constructing closed networks among familiar people and companies 
(5) Preferring of their presenting a new model of products and/or business with the 
prominent leadership for realizing the new business to their achieving very detailed and 
exact works in the given framework of business
(2.2) The origin of international competitiveness of Japanese firms
As explained in the previous section, I clarify in this section that the Total Cost of 
“Specialty products” can be minimized by Japanese firms through a combination of partial 
internal production (or partial development) of them and partial purchasing them in the 
market, if the “Specialty products have higher “asset specificity (S)” than S**, and if the 
“Specialty products” have a nature of a compounded products, which are consisted of 
other various “Specialty sub-products” (parts or intermediate goods), which have also 
higher “asset specificity (S)” than S**.  Total cost for a company, which is producing 
and selling “Specialty products” in the “The First Best market”, shall be the sum of 
development cost, and/or production cost and transaction cost of the “Specialty products”. 
If the development cost and/or production cost is mostly common among major Japanese 
firms and Western (USA and EU) firms, I clarify in this section that Japanese firms have 
prominent advantages of the minimizing transaction cost and also minimizing total cost 
in comparison with Western firms in the “The First Best market”.  The good example is 
automobile industry and ICT electronics parts industry.  The process of the minimizing 
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transaction cost and total cost is clarified in the following in this section and (2.3).
In Diagram 1 in (2.1), O. Williamson argued that one company, which procure the 
“Specialty product” with higher “asset specificity (S)” than S* prefer complete internal 
production of it within the company to purchasing it in the market because internal 
procurement is less expensive.  It is expressed in the following.
C1＋G1 ＜ C2＋G2    if S ＞ S* (1)
If we introduce internal production rate (or internal development rate) of a new 
“Specialty product”, we can express transaction cost and production (development) 
cost as functions of internal production rate (or internal development rate).  We express 
internal production rate (or internal development rate) as “α”.
Therefore,
C1＝C1(α), C2＝C2(α), G1＝G1(α), G2＝G2(α) (2)
If we assume a new “Specialty product”, which are consisted of other various “Specialty 
products” and all the “Specialty products” have higher “asset specificity (S)” than S**, 
G1＝G1(α)＝G2＝G2(α) for each “Specialty product”.  As we have already assumed 
that G1＝G1(α)＝G2＝G2(α) is common for major Japanese and Western companies 
if S ＞ S**, the minimization of transaction cost means the minimization of total cost for 
procuring the “Specialty product”.
In Diagram 1, An extention based on O. Williamson shows that 
C1(100) ＋ G1(100) ＜ C2(0) ＋ G2(0)    if S ＞ S** (3)
G1(100) ＝ G2(0) ＝ G1(2) ＝ G2(2)    if S ＞ S** (4)
However, I argue that there exists the point to minimize C1(α)＋C2(α), which is 
smaller than C1(100)in the equation (3), in Diagram 2, where horizontal axis indicates the 
degree of internal production (development) rate (α) of a “Specialty product” and where 
vertical axis indicates the intra-firm transaction cost (C1) and the market transaction 
cost (C2).  The intra-firm transaction cost (C1) is zero when the internal production 
(development) rate is zero.  If the internal production (development) rate is increased, 
the intra-firm transaction cost (C1) is also increased.  It reaches the maximum level 
when the internal production (development) rate reaches 100 %.  The market transaction 
cost is at the maximum level when the internal production (development) rate is zero. 
It reaches zero level when the internal production (development) rate reaches 100 %. 
Both intra-firm transaction cost curve (C1 curve) and market transaction cost curve (C2 
curve) are convex to horizontal axis when related firms and human being have “Japanese 
Preference”.  The reason of convexity shall be explained in (2.3).  Therefore, Strategic 
(ST) curve, which the sum of C1curve and C2 curve, is also convex to horizontal axis.
Diagram 2 indicates that the transaction cost (C1＋C2) shall be minimized at point J.  
Therefore,
Min.{C1(α)＋C2(α)}＝C1(J)＋C2(J) ＜ C1(100) ＜ C2(0)    if S ＞ S** (5)
The equations (3), (4) and (5) indicate that if asset specificity (S) is larger S**, G1＝
G1(α)＝G2＝G2(α) and if this production or development cost is common for all major 
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Japanese and Western firms by our assumption, the minimization of transaction cost 
by Japanese firms at point J means the minimization of total cost for procurement of 
this “Specialty product”.  The exactly same argument is commonly valid for all types of 
“Specialty products” (including both final products and intermediate goods), of which 
asset specificity (S) is larger S**.  Therefore, Japanese firms have prominent advantages 
in the minimization of the total cost when they supply high-value added, discriminated 
products, which have a nature of compounded “Specialty products” in the “First Best 
market.  Moreover, we can expect continuous improvement of quality of “Specialty 
products” because of the reason, which I explain in (2.3).
Diagram 2  Japanese firms’ O advantage of minimization of the transaction cost in 
procurements of specialty goods based on “Japanese preference” at the point “J” in 
the strategic (ST) curve, which means minimizing the sum of “intra-firm transaction 
cost” and “market transaction cost.”  (Produced by Shigeki TEJIMA, 2006 and 2011)
 
On the other hand, both intra-firm transaction cur ve (C1* cur ve) and market 
transaction curve (C2* curve) are concave to horizontal axis upon the condition of 
“non Japanese Preference” by the firms and human beings because of the reason, 
which I explain in the section (2.4).  In this case, we cannot achieve the transaction cost 
minimization.
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Diagram 3  Non-Japanese firms cannot achieve minimization of the transaction cost 
in procurements of specialty goods because of “Non-Japanese preference”.  There 
does not exist the point “J” of minimizing the transaction cost in the strategic (ST) 
curve  (Produced by Shigeki TEJIMA, 2006 and 2011)
 
(2.3) The mechanism for achieving “the Transaction Cost minimization” with 
 “Japanese preference”
One assembling company F1 is assumed to newly produce or develop one “Specialty 
product A”.  “Specialty product A” has enough high degree of “asset specificity (S)”, 
which is higher than S**.  Therefore, production or newly developing cost of “Specialty 
product “A” is commonly given at the constant level of G1＝G1(α)＝G2＝G2(α) for all 
internal production rate (α) of the “Specialty product “A”.  Moreover, “Specialty product 
A” is assumed to be a compounded product, that is consisted of “Specialty sub-products”, 
“asset specificity (S)” of which are also higher than S**.  At first, the assembling company 
F1 is assumed to purchase “Specialty product A” from their parts supplier F2, instead of 
internal production or development of it by F1 itself.  F1 has to pay the highest transaction 
cost (C2), in other words, highest opportunistic profit to F2, because F1 has the weakest 
bargaining power against F2 with scarce knowledge and experience of “Specialty 
product A”.  Naturally, the company F1 is eager to produce or develop continuously each 
item of “Specialty sub-product A” (say, key parts or basic architecture, etc.) in order 
of the importance.  If assembler F1 starts to produce or to develop the most important 
and highest value added sub-product, assembler F1 can dramatically strengthen the 
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bargaining power against supplier F2, because of rapidly accumulated knowledge, 
experience, know-how and technology.  If supplier F2 has “Japanese Preference”, F2 
is truly sensitive to the assembler F1’s strategy of its positively extending in-house 
production or development of more items of sub-products of “Specialty product A”.  F2 
is more eager to preserve, as far as possible, the purchasing order by F1 for residual 
“Specialty sub-products” of product “A” over the long term period than seeking for its 
opportunistic profit (market transaction cost for F1).  When F1 start internal production 
or development of the most important and the most high value added sub-product of 
“Specialty product A, ”F2 dramatically reduce the opportunistic profit (market transaction 
cost for F1) in order to weakened the extending motivation of F1.  However, even the 
enthusiasm of “Japanese Preference” by F2 for preserving the supply contracts of sub-
products of “Specialty product A” as far as possible, has been gradually discouraged when 
F1 continuously produce or develop more items of “Specialty sub-products” of product 
“A”.  Therefore, Market Transaction cost (C2) is decreased and decreasing rate of Market 
Transaction cost (C2) is also decreased when the internal production (development) rate 
(α) is increased.
Therefore,
dC2(α) / dα ＜ 0 (6)
d2C2(α) / dα2 ＞ 0 (7)
On the other hand, when assembler F1 does not produce or develop “Specialty products 
A”, intra-firm transaction cost for F1 is zero.  When F1 produce or develop the most 
important and the most high value added item of “Specialty sub-products” of product 
“A”, intra-firm transaction cost for F1 is extremely small because only limited people, 
who have “Japanese preference”, are engaged in the project.  When internal production 
or development is extended by assembler F1 to less important “Specialty sub-products” 
of product “A”, the growth of intra-firm transaction cost is moderate because employees 
of F1 prefer of preserving their job to obtaining the opportunistic profit.  However, even 
peer pressure among Japanese people to persuade diligent work in each other shall be 
gradually weakened, when the organization is enlarged in order to increase internal 
production or development fur thermore.  Therefore, Intra-firm transaction cost is 
gradually and cumulatively increased when the internal production (development) rate 
(α) is increased.  
Therefore,
dC1(α) / dα ＞ 0 (8)
d2C1(α) / dα2 ＞ 0 (9)
d2C1(α) / dα2 ＜ 0
The above argument means that both intra-firm transaction cost curve (C1 curve) and 
market transaction cost curve (C2 curve) are convex to horizontal axis upon the condition 
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of “Japanese Preference” in the firms and human being.  Therefore, Strategic (ST) curve, 
which is the sum of C1curve and C2 curve, is also convex to horizontal axis.
Above Diagram 2 in (2.2) indicates that the transaction cost (C1＋C2) shall be 
minimized at point J.  Therefore,
Min.{C1(α)＋C2(α)}＝C1(J)＋C2(J) ＜ C1(100) ＜ C2(0)    if S ＞ S** (5)
If    d{C1(J)＋C2(J)} / dα＝0  (5)’
Above argument is valid for all “Specialty products” which are consisted of “Specialty 
sub-products”, when both of them have high “asset specificity (S)”, which is higher than 
S**.
Moreover, when both assembler F1 and parts supplier F2 have “Japanese Preference”, 
they can transfer each other the precious technological information, which they obtain 
through production or development of “Specialty product A” without any risk of growing 
transaction cost.  Because the mutual transfer of technology is mutually beneficial for both 
parties if they preserve the long-lasting transaction over the long-term period.  It means 
the mechanism of “the Transaction Cost Minimization”, has also a prominent effect of 
lowering production or development cost itself and improving the quality of “Specialty 
product A”.
(2.4) The mechanism unable of achieving “the Transaction Cost minimization” 
with “non Japanese preference”
We examine the same example of (2.3) in the case of the people and firms, which 
have a nature of “Non-Japanese Preference”, instead of “Japanese Preference”.  The 
definition and assumption are exactly same to (2.3).  And the story is also mostly same 
although some of them are quite opposite from the case of (2.3).  The difference is the 
characteristics of “Non-Japanese Preference” and “Japanese Preference”.  At first, the 
assembling company F1* is assumed to purchase “Specialty product A” from their parts 
supplier F2*, instead of internal production or development by F1* itself.  F1* has to pay 
the highest transaction cost (C2*), in other words, highest opportunistic profit to F2*, 
because F1* has the weakest bargaining power against F2* with scarce knowledge and 
experience of “Specialty product A”.  Naturally, the assembler F1* is eager to produce 
or develop by itself each item of “Specialty sub-products” of product “A” in order of the 
importance of higher value added.  If assembler F1* starts to produce or develop the 
most important and highest value added sub-product, assembler F1* can dramatically 
strengthen the bargaining power against supplier F2*, because of rapidly accumulated 
knowledge, experience, know-how and technology.  However, if parts supplier F2* 
has “Non-Japanese Preference”, F2* is not sensitive to the assembler F1*’s strategy 
for extending in-house production or development of more items of “Specialty sub-
products” of product “A”.  F2* is more eager for seeking for the opportunistic profit (that 
is market transaction cost for F1*) in each procurement contract to preserving, as far 
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as possible, the purchasing order by F1* for residual “Specialty sub-products” over the 
long term period.  Parts supplier F2* is reluctant to decrease its opportunistic profit even 
when assembler F1* has strengthened the bargaining power as a result of accumulated 
knowledge, information, experience and technology.  However, gradually, F2* has 
to decrease its own opportunistic profit, facing with the cumulatively strengthened 
bargaining power of assembler F1*.  Therefore, Market Transaction cost (C2*) is 
decreased and decreasing rate of Market Transaction cost (C2*) is increasing when the 
internal production (development) rate (α) is increased.
dC2*(α) / dα ＜ 0 (10)
d2C2*(α) /dα2 ＜ 0 (11)
On the other hand, when assembler F1* does not produce or develop “Specialty 
products A”, intra-firm transaction cost for F1* is zero.  When F1* starts the most 
important and the most high value added item of “Specialty sub-products” of product 
A, intra-firm transaction cost for F1* is extremely large because the people, who have 
“Non-Japanese preference”, are engaged in the project and they try to immediately 
seek opportunistic profits.  At the beginning, the growth of intra-firm transaction cost 
is high because employee of assembler F1* prefer of their obtaining opportunistic 
profits to preserving their job.  However, if very strict control for protecting precious 
technology and know-how is effective concerning “Specialty products A”, and “Specialty 
sub-products” of product “A” and if internal production or development is extended by 
assembler F1* to less important “Specialty sub-products” of product A, motivation of 
seeking for opportunistic profit shall be gradually weakened even among people, who 
have “Non-Japanese Preference”.  Therefore, Intra-firm transaction cost is increased and 
the rate of  increase is gradually decreased when the internal production (development) 
rate (α) is increased
dC1*(α) / dα ＞ 0 (12)
d2C1*(α) /  dα2 ＜ 0 (13)
The above argument means that both intra-firm transaction curve (C1* curve) and 
market transaction curve (C2* curve) are concave to horizontal axis upon the condition 
of “Non-Japanese Preference” in the firms and human being.  Therefore, Strategic (ST*) 
curve, which is the sum of C1* Curve and C2* Curve, is also concave to horizontal axis.
Above Diagram 3 in (2.2) indicates that the transaction cost (C1*＋C2*) shall be 
maximized at point J.  Therefore,
Max.{C1*(α)＋C2*(α)}＝C1*(J*)＋C2*(J*) ＞ C2*(0) ＞ C1*(100)   if S ＞ S* (14)
If  d{C1*(J*)＋C2*(J)*} / α＝0 (14)’
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Therefore, the best choice for the assembler F1*, which has “Non-Japanese 
Preference”, is the complete in-house production or development of “Specialty asset A”, 
which is the same result to O. Williamson in Diagram 1.  The total transaction cost for the 
assembler F1* is C1*(100), which is clearly larger than Min.{C1(α)＋C2(α)}＝C1(J) ＋
C2(J), if we assume that C1(100)＝C1*(100) ＜ C2(0)＝C2*(0).  It clearly indicate that the 
best solution is Min.{C1(α)＋C2(α)}＝C1(J)＋C2(J) upon the condition with “Japanese 
Preference” in Diagram 2, only where the “Transaction Cost Minimization” is achieved.
(2.5) “Disruptive Innovation” to “gradual and ex-post” “Radical Innovation”
In summar y of the argument from (2.1) to (2.4), Japanese firms’ international 
competitiveness is the capability of supplying the most qualified “Specialty products” with 
the lowest transaction cost and with the lowest total cost in the “The First Best market” 
if we assume that G1(α)＝G2(α) ≦ G1*(α)＝G2*(α).  Japanese firms, which have 
“Japanese Preference”, have advantages in both quality and cost/price against Western 
rivals, which have “Non Japanese Preference”.  Both capability of improving quality of 
“Specialty products” and that of lowering costs/prices of those products to the lowest 
level through “the Transaction Cost Minimization” have contributed to born “Disruptive 
Innovation” (Christensen, 1997) and “gradual and ex-post” “Radical Innovation” of 
Japanese firms since 1960s in the markets of the USA and EU (EC) countries in the field 
of electronics, optical equipments, précising machinery, automobile, office machines 
etc.  Some of firms in those industries have gradually turned to “Incremental Innovation” 
(Henderson and Clark, 1990) or “Sustaining Innovation” (Christensen, 1997) from  
“Disruptive Innovation” through the 1990s and 2000s but most competitive Japanese 
firms, including automobile firms, have shifted to a new type of “Radical Innovation” 
through “Modular Innovation” (Henderson and Clark, 1990) and/or “Architectural 
Innovation” (Henderson and Clark, 1990) in the 1990s and 2000s (see Table 1).  Japanese 
firms have ef fectively utilized the mechanism described in (2.3) for their achieving 
the “Modular Innovation” and/or “Architectural Innovation.  As a result of the huge 
accumulation of the two types of innovations, they finally developed “Radical Innovation” 
in some industries.  The “Hybrid Car” is a good example of this type of “Radical 
Innovation”.  As it takes a rather long time and it requires accumulation of “Modular 
Innovation” and/or “Architectural Innovation for achieving this new type of “Radical 
Innovation”, we call it as “gradual” and “ex-post” “Radical Innovation”.  
On the other hand, original “Radical Innovation” defined by Henderson and Clark, 1990 
has a nature of the “swift” and “ex-ante” innovation, because the innovation is intentionally 
and strategically designed by prominent entrepreneurs.  The “gradual” and “ex-post” 
“Radical Innovation” is advantageous for Japanese firms, because they can fully utilize the 
mechanism of “the Transaction Cost Minimization” but may have some disadvantageous 
factors in the age of drastic change of the global markets discussed in Chapter 3 because 
of its relative insensitiveness to the rapid change of the global market.  On the other hand, 
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the “swift” and “ex-ante” “Radical Innovation” has more severe sensitiveness to the trend 
of the global market because it is strongly led by prominent entrepreneurs, who wish to 
take high risks while seeking for high profits.  
Table 1  Evolution of Innovation
(The table by Henderson and Clark, 1990 amended by Shigeki TEJIMA)
 
III. Change of the global markets
Drastic change of the global economy has serious ef fects on Japanese firms’ 
international competitiveness described in Chapter II.  The most important change 
for Japanese firms is “Commoditization” in both demand and supply side of the 
Global economy.  The “Commoditization” means the drastic shift from “the Specialty 
products, which have high asset specificity” to “Common goods (commodity), which 
have low asset specificity” in most of the industries in both supply and demand 
sides iii.  “Commoditization” is prevailing now as a result of, first, “ICT (Information 
Communication Technology) revolution”, second, the global demand shift from “the 
First Best market, which is defined in (2.2),” to “the Second Best market, which is 
defined below”, and, third, the globalization of Multinational Corporations (MNCs), 
which are seeking lower costed production sites in foreign countries and are seeking 
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new possibility in emerging markets.  Many of Japanese MNCs have also contributed 
to “Commoditization” in supply side as described in Chapter IV.  Probably, the most 
prominent phenomenon of the “Commoditization” is the growth of “the Second Best 
market” in the world, which is deeply related to “Disruptive Innovation” by Asian 
companies.  
“The Second Best market” is defined as the price-competitive markets, nature of which 
is buyers’ preferring “Commodity products, which has intermediate quality enough to 
satisfy the demand of purchaser”, in competitive price to higher priced and higher value 
added products.  “The Second Best market” is mainly prevailing in developing countries 
and also are growing rapidly in developed countries.
“Commoditization” causes accelerated shortening of life cycle of newly developed 
“Specialty” products, in both demand and supply sides.  Therefore, even the industries, 
which are now in the competition among discriminated products, are easily shifted to 
the industries, which are facing with severe price competition of commodity products. 
Developed countries’ MNCs can easily loose competitiveness in such commodity 
industries, where commoditized items are prevailing and developing countries’ MNCs are 
competitive with their “Disruptive Innovation” in those industries.
Among all developed countries’ MNCs, Japanese MNCs may suffer most severely in 
this trend of “Commoditization” because Japanese firms’ “gradual” and “ex-post” “Radical 
Innovation” has taken longer time to be achieved than the “swift” and “ex-ante” “Radical 
Innovation” by Western firms.
Taking into account the effects of “Commoditization” in both demand and supply sides, 
we can classify the international competitiveness of Japanese firms, Western firms, and 
Asian firms, by industry, depending on the characteristic criteria of both demand side and 
supply side in Table 2.  
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Table 2  Competitiveness Matrix of industry by supply factors and by demand 
factors  (Shigeki TEJIMA 2006, 2011)
 
(A) industry   
In (A) industry, because of the high complexity of “Specialty products, which are 
popular in both final goods and key parts”, “Commoditization” of the “Specialty products 
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(including both final products and intermediate goods)” cannot be easily achieved in 
supply side.  In demand side, the global markets as “the First Best market”, which prefers 
high value added and highly priced differentiated (discriminated) products, exist in the 
large scale.  
In (A) industry, Japan’s automobile companies preserve high competitiveness of 
supplying their discriminated products, which have higher quality and lower price than 
their rivals through “the Transaction Cost Minimization” in R&D and production with the 
“gradual” and “ex-post” “Radical Innovation”, all of which are described in chapter II. 
(B1) industry   
In (B1) industry, because of the enough complexity of “Specialty products, which 
are key par ts”, “Commoditization” of the “Specialty products (par ts)” cannot be 
easily achieved in supply side although final products can be easily standardized and 
commoditized.  In demand side of the global market for the “Specialty products (parts)”, 
“the First Best market”, which prefers high value added and highly priced differentiated 
(discriminated) products, is still alive in the large scale.  
In (B1) industry, Japan’s ICT electronics parts companies preserve the competitiveness 
of supplying their discriminated products, which have higher quality and lower price than 
their rivals through “the Transaction Cost Minimization” in R&D and production with the 
“gradual” and “ex-post” “Radical Innovation” , all of which are described in chapter II. 
However, it is noteworthy that Japanese parts companies in (B1) industry cannot 
control the brand value of the commoditized final products.
(B2) industry
In (B2) industry, because of the enough complexity of “Specialty products, which 
are key parts, basic design or operating system”, “Commoditization” of the “Specialty 
products (parts)” cannot be easily achieved in supply side although final products can 
be easily standardized and commoditized.  Moreover, producers of “specialty” parts, 
basic design or operating system have enough power to determine the brand value 
of “commoditized” final goods in (B2) industry.  Western ICT electronics companies 
can control brand value of final products, through preserving its competitiveness of its 
discriminated intermediate goods/ services (parts/ components/ architecture), which 
is a typical form of the “swift” and “ex-ante” “Radical Innovation”.  Some examples of the 
industry are OS, CPU or MPU of Microsoft and Intel, which determine the value of a PC 
itself.  Unfortunately, few Japanese firms are in (B2) industries.  
 (C) industry 
Par ts and final products of this industr y may be easily standardized and/or 
commoditized.  However, firms in this industry can discriminate their products with their 
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branding power and/or their capability of internationally organizing “de facto standard” 
among related companies.  As a result, the world markets accept the products of (C) 
industry as high value added and discriminated products, which means one form of 
“discrimination” in the name of “standardization”.  Therefore, they can preserve “the 
First Best Market” even in the age of the “Commoditization”.  Western ICT electronics 
companies can create brand value of final products and/ or intermediate goods/ services 
(parts/ components/ architecture) through building “de facto standard”.  Unfortunately, 
few Japanese firms can be internationally competitive in this industry.
(D1) industry 
If the high complexity of “Specialty products”, which are both final goods and key 
parts” in (A) industry can be technically solved and both of them are commoditized, (A) 
industry is shifted to (D1) industry.  The shift shall be accompanied with the emergence 
of  a large scaled “Second Best market”.
In (D1) industry, Asian companies, especially, in ICT and electronics industries can be 
competitive with a “disruptive innovation” while Japanese firms in (A) or (D1) industry 
may loose their competitiveness.   
(D2) industry   
If the high complexity of “Specialty products, which are key parts” in (B1) industry 
can be technically solved and they are commoditized, (B1) industry is shifted to (D2) 
industry.  The shift creates a large scaled “Second Best market”.
In (D2) industry, Asian companies, especially, in ICT and electronics industry, can be 
competitive with a “disruptive innovation” while Japanese firms in (B1) or (D2) industry 
may loose their competitiveness.
(D3) industry   
If the high complexity of “Specialty products, which are key parts, basic design or 
operating system” in (B2) industry can be technically solved and they are commoditized, 
(B2) industry is shifted to (D3) industry.  The shift creates a large scaled “Second Best 
market”. 
Asian companies in (D3) industry can be competitive, especially, in ICT and electronics 
industries with a “disruptive innovation” while Western firms in (B2) industry may loose 
their competitiveness.  However, Western firms may develop swiftly new “Specialty 
products, which become newly key parts, basic design or operating system” in (B2) 
industry with the “swift” and “ex-ante” “Radical Innovation”. 
   
(D4) industry   
If Western firms’ discriminating strategy of their products with their branding power 
and/or their organizing capability of “de facto standard” can be less effective over the long 
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term period.  (C) industry is shifted to (D4) industry.  Asian companies in (D4) industry 
can be competitive with a “disruptive innovation” while Western firms in (C) industry may 
loose their competitiveness. 
Chart 1  Changing markets of each industry
((Shigeki TEJIMA 2011)
In summar y, Japanese firms are competitive in (A) industr y and (B1) industr y, 
because they have clear competitiveness of supplying their discriminated products, 
which have higher quality and lower price than their rivals through “the Transaction 
Cost Minimization” in R&D and production with the “gradual” and “ex-post” “Radical 
Innovation”.  Western firms are competitive in (B2) industry and (C) industry with the 
“swift” and “ex-ante” “Radical Innovation” and their capability of constructing “defact 
standard” and global brand.  Asian firms are competitive in (D1), (D2), (D3) and (D4) 
industries with the “disruptive innovation”.  
Both Japanese and Western firms are suffering from global trend of “Commoditization” 
in Chart 1, where (A), (B1), (B2), (C) industry are shrinking, especially, in developed 
countries, but Western firms may be more advantageous than Japanese firms because 
the “swift” and “ex-ante” “Radical Innovation” by Western firms can be more easily 
responding to the accelerated shortening of life time of newly developed products in the 
“Commoditization” age than the “gradual” and “ex-post” “Radical Innovation” by Japanese 
firms.     
Because of high economic growth of developing countries and stagnant economy 
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of developed countries, (A), (B1), (B2), (C) industries in developing countries have 
more business opportunity in future.  However, again, Japanese  firms’ competitiveness, 
which is based on “the Transaction Cost Minimization” in R&D and production with 
the “gradual” and “ex-post” “Radical Innovation”, may encounter much dif ficulty in 
constructing “the new First Best market” in developing countries, above all, in emerging 
economies.  Indeed, Japanese firms have succeeded in constructing “their First Best 
market” in developed countries in the 1980 to now through their “Disruptive Innovation” 
and “gradual” and “ex-post” “Radical Innovation”, which I described in (2.5).  However, it 
is noteworthy that, naturally, “newly growing First Best market” in developing countries, 
above all, in emerging markets have quite different characteristics from those of Western 
countries and Japan.  Japanese firms” “gradual” and “ex-post” “Radical Innovation”, may 
be less sensitive to the trend of those “newly growing First Best market” in developing 
countries than the “swift” and “ex-ante” “Radical Innovation” by Western firms.
IV. The effects of Japan’s FDI on Japanese firms’ competitiveness
(4.1) O, L, I Advantages of Japanese firms and dilemma of Japan’s FDI
Japanese firms’ international competitiveness, which is clarified in Chapter II, can 
be described in the frame work of O, L, I advantages iv in Eclectic theory of J. Dunning. 
First, “Ownership (O) Advantage” of Japanese firms in manufacturing sectors is the 
capability of their achieving “Minimization of Transaction Cost” in newly development 
of “Specialty products” and production of them, utilizing the “Japanese Preference” and 
Japanese firms’ “Transaction Cost Minimizing (TCM) organization”, which are defined 
in chapter II.  Second, “Internalization (I) Advantage” of Japanese firms in manufacturing 
sectors is well established and managed “TCM organization” of Japanese firms.  Effective 
TCM organization can effectuate the capability of human resources, who have “Japanese 
Preference”.  Third, “Location (L) Advantage” of Japanese firms in manufacturing sectors 
is “Japanese Preference” defined in (2.1), which is prevaling among Japanese people 
and companies.  In a word, Japan’s Multinational Corporations (MNCs) have their O, 
L. I advantages in Japan.  Unfortunately, their O, L. I advantages do not exist in the 
most of foreign countries because of “Non-Japanese Preference”, which are prevailing 
among foreign firms and human resources.  Therefore, Japanese firms have to face 
with a serious dilemma regarding the core of international competitiveness when they 
engage in FDI.  Clearly, the positive role of Japan’s FDI is preserving the market of host 
countries through avoiding foreign exchange risk of continuously appreciated Japanese 
Yen and also avoiding potential trade friction with host countries.  On the other hand, the 
negative effect of Japan’s FDI is caused by “Location Dis-advantage” of “non Japanese 
preference” which is prevailing in the world outside Japan.  Additionally, Japan’s FDI was 
a stimulation vehicle of “standardization or commoditization” of precious fruits of various 
process innovation and products innovation achieved by Japanese firms in Japan, through 
the process of extending them to foreign affiliates, which causes large scaled emission or 
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“spill over” of the standardized technology to foreign countries, especially, in Asia.
(4.2) The FDI performances of Japanese affiliates
According to the eclectic theory by J. Dunning, MNCs shall conduct a FDI project 
if O, L, I advantages are achieved by their foreign affiliates’ overseas business through 
FDI.  It means that the FDI project shall be implemented when higher profitability can be 
expected than domestic investment project.
However, Japanese firms are facing with some of the location disadvantages based 
on “Non Japanese preference” in foreign countries.  The following graphs show the 
profitability of Japanese affiliates in foreign countries is not so satisfied in comparison with 
that of Japanese firms in Japan and foreign firms’ affiliates in Japan.
Graph 3  Sales Profit Ratio of Japanese firms in Japan, their affiliates in foreign 
countries, and foreign affiliates in Japan in all manufacturing industries  (Ministry of 
Finance, Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry)
 
− 62 −
Graph 4  Sales Profit Ratio of Japanese firms in Japan, their affiliates in foreign 
countries, and foreign affiliates in Japan in transportation machinery industry 
(Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry)
 
Graph 5  Sales Profit Ratio of Japanese firms in Japan, their affiliates in foreign 
countries, and foreign affiliates in Japan in electronics/electric machinery industry 
(Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry)
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If we compare “Sales Profit Ratio” v of Japanese firms in Japan, with their affiliates 
in foreign countries, and foreign affiliates in Japan, we know that the ratio of Japanese 
overseas affiliates was mostly same level as Japanese firms in Japan in all manufacturing 
industries (Graph 3) and the ratio of Japanese overseas affiliates was less satisfied in both 
transportation machinery industry (Graph 4) and electronics/electric machinery industry 
(Graph 5) than that of Japanese firms. 
For Japanese firms’ affiliates in foreign countries, it is rather difficult to completely 
realize the competitiveness of supplying their discriminated products, which have higher 
quality and lower price than their rivals through “the Transaction Cost Minimization” in 
R&D and production with the “gradual” and “ex-post” “Radical Innovation”, because of 
“Non-Japanese preference” in foreign countries.  Location advantage of Japan’s FDI for 
preserving lower production cost and the local market has to be offset by the weakened 
international competitiveness of Japanese firms.  This is a serious dilemma for Japanese 
firms when they engage in FDI.  Japanese MNCs have developed their FDI, and their 
foreign affiliates more than 40 years and still they are struggling for reconstructing their 
international competitiveness in foreign countries.
V. Conclusion: Tasks for Japanese firms and strategies for them
Japan’s MNCs in (A) industr y, which is argued in Table 2 in chapter III, have 
established competitive production bases globally in order to preserve truly sophisticated 
and large scale markets in the world since 1980s, while preserving their own advantages 
of “Transaction Cost minimization” based on “Japanese Preference” and “TCM” 
organization.  They have extended their way of management and production, based 
on “Japanese Preference” and “TCM organization”, which require the mutual reliance 
between employers and employees and between parts suppliers and assemblers, as far 
as possible to the everyplace of the world through their persuading their trade partners 
and their employees from “Non-Japanese Preference” to “Japanese Preference”.  They 
have obtained good results in the USA and Southeast Asia but, generally speaking, still 
their affiliates’ performance in foreign countries is less satisfied than domestic business in 
Japan. (Graph 4)
Moreover, they have a big task in their foreign business regarding the creation of new 
markets.  Their developing the sophisticated “First Best markets”, especially, in emerging 
economies has become extremely important for Japanese firms in (A) industry because 
they are facing with the changing global market described in Chart 1 of the chapter 
III.  Traditional “gradual” and “ex-post” “Radical Innovation” may not be enough for 
their creating a new large scale market in developing countries, above all, in emerging 
economies, whose market characteristics are quite different from those of traditional 
“First Best markets”.  They have to effectively utilize the capable human resources, who 
have “Non-Japanese Preference” in their “TCM organization.  It is a big challenge to be 
achieved by Japanese firms in (A) industry. 
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For Japanese firms in (B1) industry, the above argument for (A) industry is, to some 
extent, valid.  However, Japan’s MNCs in (B1), (B2) and (C) industry have to strengthen 
their competitiveness through creating the “swift” and “ex-ante” “Radical Innovation” 
for responding to the changing global market described in Chart 1 of the chapter III.  In 
order to achieve the task, Western firms’ organization, which is consisted of Non-Japanese 
human resources, shall be introduced in to the organization of Japanese firms.  We call the 
Western firms’ organization as “SMD (Specialty Market Development) organization”. The 
“SMD organization” is devised to effectively utilize Non-Japanese human resources, who 
have “Non-Japanese preference”.  The “SMD organization” cannot achieve minimization 
of transaction cost of “Specialty” goods, as we discussed in (2.4).  However, SMD 
organization has advantages in newly and swiftly developing high value added products, 
which can be accepted in global markets, through achieving the “swift” and “ex-ante” 
“Radical Innovation”.  SMD organization has also the advantage to more skillfully utilize 
global human resources than TCM organization because many people of the world 
have “Non-Japanese Preference.  Therefore, the task for Japanese firms in all industry 
is effective introduction of advantages of “SMD” organization into “TCM” organization, 
while preserving advantages of “TCM” organization, which is a source of competitiveness 
in both (A) industry and (B1) industry.
However, the basic nature of the “TCM organization” is quite opposite from the “SMD 
organization”.  The former is based on human resources, who have “Japanese Preference” 
with effective incentive system for the people of “Japanese Preference”.  The latter is 
based on human resources, who have “Non-Japanese Preference” with effective incentive 
system for the people of “Non- Japanese preference”.  It means that effective introduction 
of advantages of the “SMD organization” into the “TCM organization” is not a easy 
work.  One idea is co-existence of the “TCM organization” and the “SMD organization” 
within the headquarter in Japan and also within their foreign affiliates, which shall be 
temporarily introduced with some independency of the “SMD organization”.
Over the medium and long-term period, the best mix of two organizations shall be 
created in order to succeed in both the “gradual” and “ex-post” “Radical Innovation” and 
the “swift” and “ex-ante” “Radical Innovation” and to develop the new types of “Radical 
Innovation”.  (The end of the paper)
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Abstract
Japanese firms’ Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
and its international competitiveness
Shigeki TEJIMA 
One principal reason of Japan’s stagnant economic growth for the past 20 years was 
shrinking domestic investment by Japanese multinational corporations while they are 
more aggressive in Foreign Direct Investment (FDI).  Global business by Japanese 
MNCs and their af filiates through FDI is now more important way of international 
business than international trade.  However, Japan’s FDI has dual role on its international 
competitiveness.  Its positive role is preser ving global market and overseas low 
production cost bases for Japanese firms and its negative role may weaken, to some 
extent, Japanese firms’ competitiveness.  In this paper, the core of the international 
competitiveness of Japanese firms is clarified.  The core is Japanese firms’ management 
and production system to supply the most qualified “Specialty products” with the lowest 
cost and price in the “The First Best market” through the system of “Transaction Cost 
Minimization” in R&D and production of them with the “gradual and ex-post” “Radical 
Innovation”.  However, the global trend of “Commoditization” in demand and supply sides 
and “Location Disadvantage” in foreign business have considerably damaged Japanese 
firms’ international competitiveness.  The reconstruction of Japanese firms’ international 
competitiveness through new organizations and new innovations is a necessary condition 
for the reconstruction of Japanese competitiveness and Japanese economy.
アブストラクト
日本企業の海外直接投資とその国際競争力
手島茂樹
　過去 20 年に及ぶ日本経済の停滞の主因の一つは、民間企業、特に多国籍企業の国内設備投
資の低迷である。一方、これら企業は、海外直接投資については、より積極的な態度を示し
てきた。この結果、日本の多国籍企業およびその海外子会社による海外事業活動は、いまや、
国際貿易よりもはるかに重要な、海外経済取引の手段となっている。しかしながら、海外直
接投資が日本企業の国際競争力に及ぼす影響には、プラスとマイナスの二面性がある。本論
文では、日本企業固有の国際競争力の本質とは何かを、まず、明らかにする。競争力の核心は、
「取引費用最小化達成メカニズム」に基づいて、「漸進的」かつ「事後的」な「革新的イノベー
ション」を実現し、「ファーストベスト市場」に対して、最高品質の「特殊品」を、最小の費用・
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価格を実現しながら開発・供給することである。しかしながら、需要・供給両面からの世界
規模での「汎用品化」（日本企業の海外事業展開はかなりの程度それに貢献した）および日本
企業が海外事業展開するに際しての「立地の不利性」（「立地の優位性ではなく」）は、日本企
業の国際競争力を損なってきた面がある。このため、企業組織変革により新しいイノベーショ
ン・システムを確立して、海外事業展開を通して、日本企業の新たな国際競争力を確立する
ことこそが、日本経済再活性化のための必須の要件である。
